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Abstract 
The existence of several ethnic, religious and/or linguistic groups whose rights are not 
acknowledged or are continuously violated leads to tension with unpredictable 
consequences. If, in some cases, those groups use peaceful means to ensure that their 
specificities are acknowledged but, in other cases, there is frequent use of force to attain the 
same goals. This type of conflict occurred in the western Balkans in the 1990s or still take 
place in regions such as the Caucasus, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria or 
Myanmar in which the ethnic element, together with the religious issue, are the main 
causes. 
Though it is true that several solutions have been presented to respond to the tensions 
inherent to ethnic diversity of multinational States, it is also true that the several theoretical 
practical models have not always met the objectives and, above all, resolved situations of 
peace, which are often of negative peace. From minority rights to federalism, we may 
identify principles whose importance and adequacy to contexts may be defined as formal 
peace. Nevertheless, it remains important to include and frame those elements within 
specific cases, considering that each case is different and adapting these principles to a 
specific situation does not prevent them from being inadequate to a situation apparently 
similar. 
It is therefore crucial that considerations are raised on the role a political and administrative 
organization model such as federalism may play, partly as a complement to the law of 
minorities as a tool to manage ethnic diversity in States that may be defined as 
multinational, as well as to prevent ethnic conflicts. 
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Introduction 
As the title indicates, this paper aims to make a general comment on the role of 
federalism in managing ethnic diversity in multinational States and, thus, in preventing 
conflicts whose cause is partly or entirely due to ethnic issues associated with 
nationalism and one or more actors involved. The issue is as complex as its implications 
in terms of a State's political and administrative organization. 
Therefore, an approach to this issue implies not only a presentation of the federal 
model as a viable solution to prevent ethnic national conflicts but also as an 
understanding of the difficulties faced by multinational States in managing their ethnic 
diversity. Therefore, this paper aims firstly to analyze this issue from the point of view 
of minority rights and their acceptance and application by this type of States and then 
analyze the federal model, considering the lack of respect for minority rights increases 
the risk of ethnic conflict in contexts where ethnic tension is smoldering. 
This paper does not aim to define the concept of federalism nor to put forth the federal 
model as the only possible outcome in contexts of ethnic tension. What we aim is to 
present elements that allow assessing the potential of this model considering its 
advantages in fostering greater equality among ethnic groups within the same State. 
 
Multinational States and acknowledging internal idiosyncrasies  
Considering that the creation of multinational States is a consequence of several 
elements (historical, economic, cultural, and religious) and their maintenance is a 
complex task, regardless of the type of State structure (city-State, monarchy, republic, 
empire or other). 
According to Jennifer Jackson Preece, 
 
minorities are no more than ethnic nations that were unable to attain 
the final objective of ethnic nationalism - independence in relation to its 
State-nation - whose existence is, therefore, within the political borders 
of another nation's State; its own existence in an uncomfortable 
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reminder of the 'belief in national self-determination' in international 
society [...]. In short, the issue of minorities only arises in the context of 
State-nations and is the direct result of its anomalies and 
inconsistencies (1998: 29). 
 
These anomalies that several States have attempted to resolve, mostly after several 
internal movements have appeared claiming the belonging to these "ethnic nations" or 
"Stateless nations". In the last decades of the 20th century, some devolving solutions 
have appeared  as responses by States to internal centrifugal tendencies, namely in 
Europe. The United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Belgium and even France are examples of 
western democracies that moved in that direction by opting for a political and 
administrative restructuring to resolve ethnic national and ethnic regional claims. These 
claims are different in terms of their ability to destabilize that harmony and unity within 
the national space, as well as in terms of perspective. And because each State has its 
own issues, the solution must also vary according to each case and local specificities. 
There is ample literature on ethnic conflict and institutional schemes as regulators of 
tension between the State and its groups in terms of non-violence and includes several 
solutions on conflict prevention, management and resolution. Some authors merely 
make generic reference to existing possibilities, other create endless lists. In short, we 
may state that conflict resolution and prevention through institutional schemes includes 
creating mechanisms such as territorial and non-territorial self-government, division of 
power at local and central levels, cross-border institutions, paradiplomacy or measures 
promoting human and minorities' rights (Cordell & Wolf, 2010: 87). On furthering these 
options, William Safran (1994) presents several State policies he defines as being 
positivist/plural; federalism according to ethnic criteria, quasi-federalism and pseudo-
federalism; local and/or regional autonomy; association; functional decentralization; 
public servant rotation; local autonomy and/or mixed functional decentralization; 
communal representation; legislative representation guaranteed to major ethnic racial 
groups; multiple legal and court systems, with different functions; acknowledgment of 
official or co-official status to several languages and institutionalized multilingualism; 
affirmative action; distinction between citizenship and nationality; allocation of 
sponsorships; promotion and subsidization of cultural creations by ethnic minorities.  
Another solution is adopting policies that promote non-territorial autonomy, also known 
as personal (or cultural) autonomy, the latter based on the ideas by Otto Bauer and 
Karl Renner (Bottomore & Goode, 1978), two Austrian Marxist thinkers. However, 
whatever the State responses are, they all use territorial decentralization (and 
frequently federalization and pseudo-federalization) as a synthesis of the interests of 
central and local (regional) powers, thus preventing that the response may become a 
legal basis for new claims. 
 
Minority rights as a response to the claims of "ethnic nations" 
If we limit our analysis to Europe, we may realize that the protection of national 
minorities is now within the scope of several international organizations (for example: 
the Council of Europe, the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Baltic Sea States, and the 
European Central Initiative). The role played by these organizations has been studied 
by several authors who focus on the issue of the minority rights from different angles 
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(Pentassuglia, 2004; Hogan-Brun & Wolff, 2003; Thornberry, 2001; Trifunovska, 
2001a)1
The protection of national minorities is not a recent phenomenon. It has indeed become 
an internationally acknowledged principle at the end of WWI, when the United States 
president Woodrow Wilson defined the Fourteen Points and their partial adoption by the 
winning powers. However, and despite several conventions, such as the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages or the Tool of the European Central Initiative for the Protection 
of the Rights of Minorities, where recommendations may be found on the protection of 
those minorities, these are not fully abode to by the signing States. According to 
Trifunovska (2001), the Council of Europe defends the idea that individuals belonging 
to a minority have several rights because of that. Minorities have thus the right to be 
acknowledged as part of the State they live in, the right to keep and develop their 
culture; the right to keep their educational, religious and cultural institutions; and the 
right to participate and be fully fledged subjects of law in decision-making in terms of 
subjects directly related to them (2001: 146). 
. 
Among the several European convention on this issue, the best-known is the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, issued by the Council of 
Europe in 1995 (COE, 1995). Of the forty-seven Member-States of the Council of 
Europe, only four have not signed this convention, France being one of these 
exceptions2 as this country does not recognize the existence of minorities in its 
territory. Noteworthy is also the fact that of all the States that have signed the 
Framework Convention, only thirty-nine have ratified it3. Another very important 
document on the protection of minorities, particularly in linguistic terms, is the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (COE, 1992). In this case, only 
twenty-five countries have ratified the convention and eight other countries have 
signed it but not ratified it4. Not signing and not ratifying the Charter is due to several 
issues, from the non-existence of national minorities and, consequently, no regional or 
minority languages, to internal linguistic policies. It is rather clear that the existence of 
such a document is not enough to ensure legal rights to minorities, at least in States 
that did not sign it nor that those (legal) rights are complied with in those States that 
did sign it. References to the violation of the minority rights or these rights not being 
acknowledged is frequent, not only in literature but also in the local and national media 
of several States, as well as in reports by international organizations that focus on the 
protection of minorities, as is the case of OSCE and its High Commissioner for National 
Minorities, several research centers5
                                                        
1  See also Rechel (2009); Packer (2005); Philips (2005); Alcock (2000). 
 or non-governmental organizations such as 
Freedom House, Minority Rights Group International and the Human Rights Watch. The 
Baltic countries (in particular Estonia and Latvia) are frequently faces with the claims of 
their Russian minorities. The Macedonian minority in Bulgaria was not legally 
acknowledged by the local authorities. The Polish are still discriminated against by the 
2  The other exceptions are Andorra, Monaco and Turkey. 
3  The countries which did not ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities are 
Belgium, Greece, Iceland and Luxembourg. 
4  The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was not ratified by Azerbaijan, France, Iceland, 
Italy, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Macedonia. Besides these countries, there are fourteen other 
that did not sign it. That's the case of the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Albania, 
Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Monaco, Portugal, San Marino and Turkey. 
5 Noteworthy is the ECMI, or European Centre for Minority Issues, based in the German city of Flensburg. 
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Lithuanians despite a common history and peaceful relations between the two 
communities. Yet, it is not our intention to state that minority rights are constantly 
violated by these States, nor that these are situations in which ethnic or religious 
persecution takes place comparable to the progroms in the 1980s. The results of the 
recent referendum on Russian becoming an official language in Latvia6
The non-compliance to some of those rights is a reality in some countries but it not 
necessarily is a recurring and persistent practice. In situations in which minority rights 
are complied with, even if there are no legal documents on this issue, the non-
signatories may argue that respect for local and regional specificities, as well as for 
national identities, does not require any legal binding. This way, that legal binding 
would be unnecessary when respect for national minorities is a tradition. Refusal to sign 
and ratify international conventions (at regional and global levels) is not only due to a 
set of more or less rooted best practices or the simple non-existence of national 
minorities in a specific State. Besides international conventions, there are several 
bilateral agreements so as to correct historical "errors". These are, to a certain extent, 
part of a reconciliation process, more important even when it is frequently due to 
international negotiations towards the accession to supra-national institutions or 
bodies. They are different because they were mostly signed in the 1990s, after the Cold 
War, and they refer to the issue of national minorities in central and Eastern Europe 
(Hornburg, 2006; Gál, 1999). 
 (more than a 
quarter of the country's population speaks Russian and a third of the population is of 
Russian ethnicity) showed that most voters were against the proposal (75%).  It 
appears obvious that submitting minority rights to popular vote frequently leads to 
their being denied. In the case of Latvia, the result was expected, not only because of 
the country's recent history and the existence of a Russian minority that is viewed as a 
consequence of the denationalization policy in Latvia by Soviet authorities, as well as 
due to suspicions of referendum orchestration by Moscow. 
 
Federalism as a tool for conflict prevention 
Though it is true that federalism is not at the basis of minority rights, it is also true that 
the minority rights may lead to federal regimes. In such cases, federalism arises as a 
definitive solution, i.e., when peaceful management of local and regional differences 
resulting from there being ethnic national minorities but via other legal and/or cultural 
mechanisms. 
 
In former decades, violence and political dissent in the Basque Country, 
in Corsica and in Northern Ireland, for example, were considered as 
evidence of failure in State integration. Presently, a certain national 
                                                        
6  The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Aleksander Lukashevich expressed Russian authorities’ outrage at 
the result of the referendum. According to him, the rights of Russian speakers were being disrespected by 
the Latvian State, and the latter would be disrespecting international obligations 
(http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120219/171400820.html, último acesso a 14-VII-2013). Latvia is one of the 
countris which did not sign the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The country signed 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995, though, and ratified it ten 
years later, The last resolution of the first monitoring cycle, presented by the Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers on 30 March 2011 mentions the difficulties citizens belonging to national 
minorities felt in their relations with the State due to their languages not being acknowledged. 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 4, n.º 2 (November 2013-April 2014), pp. 104-117  
Considerations on the role of federalism in managing ethnic plurality  
in multinational states in conflict prevention 
Daniel Rodrigues 
 109 
 
acknowledgment and infra-State autonomy has led to a decrease in 
violence as a tactical actions. (Williams, 2009: 199). 
 
Based on the theory on the origin of federal States, what reasons may justify the 
adoption of a federal regime instead of the existence of separate States or secession by 
parts of a given State? What is at the basis of centripetal or centrifugal federalisms? 
Firstly, it is possible to realize that, according to several authors, federations (and in 
particular multinational federations) are seen as a viable tool in promoting peace and 
being used as a conflict prevention tool. Many are, therefore, created to respond to 
fears resulting from the possibility of a conflict. By forming a federation, formerly 
independent States aim for a sense of power, real or imagined, or, depending on the 
perspective, a greater power than that held by each individual State. This feeling may 
be real or imagined but is able to dissuade possible aggressors and/or avoid conflicts 
among federation members, as was the case of the Iroquois Confederation. Neta C. 
Crawford argues that, 
 
as a security regime, the Iroquois Federation functioned well in terms of 
decreasing conflict among its members. Later it was partially successful 
by allowing the Iroquois nations to adapt to exogenous shocks as a 
consequence of the arrival of the Europeans - mass epidemic 
depopulation, disruption of local economy and wars among the 
Europeans - because it laid the basis for diplomacy and collective 
security. (1994: 346). 
 
This idea appears in the work of several European thinkers who advocated federalism 
applied to the Old Continent. Altiero Spinelli and Ernest Rossi's (1941) Ventotene 
Manifesto, published in 1941 is an example of this; the text was a response to the 
violence caused by World War II and European authoritarian regimes. John Stuart Mill 
argues, though, that for a federal regime to become a valid conflict prevention tool, it 
cannot become more aggressive than each member-State of the federation. 
Secondly, the argument according to which there is higher economic efficiency in 
federations appears as one its positive elements, federations are considered more able 
to promote economic prosperity. This is highly debatable but a rather attractive 
argument. Ideas are pout forth such as creating a bigger internal market without 
boundaries7
                                                        
7  It is not by chance that the unification of Germany was preceded by the elimination of customs rates in 
the German territories through the creation of Zollverein in 1818 and their development and expansion to 
most German States. 
 or the that federations can become important global actors, able to 
influence rules in international trade (which may be the case of some federations but 
not of all)  It is also common that reference be made to binomial trade/prosperity as 
positive factors of peace, which may be easily found in several peace projects in the 
modern era. Thirdly, the creation of a federal regime may enhance the development of 
a regime that protects minorities through creating mechanisms to accommodate them. 
These may include a limitation of the sovereignty of the federate members through 
attributing a power of intervention to the federal power in their internal affairs when 
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minority rights have been violated. The validity of this argument depends on the nature 
of the federal State. If the latter also disrespects minority rights, then the power of 
intervention it has been assigned is corrupted. Fourthly, federations may make it easier 
to attain certain objectives of previously independent sovereign States. Transferring 
some powers and competences to a common body, the federal State, will allow it to 
coordinate external activities such as foreign policy. This coordination at federal level 
may become out of control because it requires more coordination in other sectors and, 
therefore, lead to power centralization. Fifthly, federal entities have more political 
influence within the federation. In the case of previously independent territories, these 
obtain advantages through political alliance, such as the previously mentioned 
coordination. Small State (or former regions and provinces) may acquire greater 
recognition and power to decide when belonging to a federal State. 
On the other hand, we must also understand the reasons for choosing a federal type of 
regime instead of a unitary State. The reasons presented are also diverse, some similar 
to those mentioned above. When opposing himself to the unitary and centralizing 
federal model, Proudhon states that 
 
the federal system tackles the people's effervescence at its roots, along 
with its ambitions and demagogic enthusiasm: it kills the public square 
regime, the triumph of speakers and the dissolving of capitals. [...] The 
federation thus becomes the people's salvation: it saves it from the 
tyranny of its leaders and from its own insanity by dividing it. (1863: 
100-101). 
 
Federalism as a complement to minority rights 
As mentioned earlier, unitary States are criticized because of their policies towards 
minorities in their territory. As these States are a consequence of power centralization 
and periphery assimilation, one national group dominates the others, the latter being 
integrated in the national community, which should be encompassing and including all 
territories under State authority. This double policy led to minorities being denied their 
rights. Federalism may be a protection against central power by providing them with 
powers and duties laid down in the constitution. Secondly, and as a result of the 
previous argument, federal systems may accommodate the so-called "stateless 
nations", regardless of their claims. Federalism may be a response to a desire for 
secession or self-determination by those nations, as well as a solution for preserving 
local identity - culture, language or religion. In the 19080s Stanislaw Ehrlich said that 
 
federal systems opt for territorial decentralization for who holds the 
power, which sovereignty. Federal institutions are ideologically neutral, 
their objective being to decentralize power or to protect ethnic identity 
in their midst. Marxists favor unitary governments, accepting federalism 
as a means to avoid the dissolution of the State. [...] Secession is 
usually fought against through force [...] Federalism has a future! 
(1984: 359). 
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Thirdly, the federal model allows for greater participation by citizens in public decision-
making, either through deliberation or through holding positions in federal entities or 
within the structure of the federal State. Finally, the federal structure, and in particular 
the asymmetric federations, may include several ethnic groups in a specific area of a 
territory and not subject them to the same legal regime as the whole of the territory, 
thus, protecting them from the "tyranny of the majority" when this is against their 
interests. This type of unitary regime minimizes repression to a certain extent and is 
sensitive to the needs of a larger number of citizens. 
Though not restricted to multinational States, federalist theories easily develop their 
proposals in these States so as to prevent conflicts, manage violent ethnic tensions 
and, ultimately, maintain their territorial integrity. From a political point of view, 
adopting federalizing measures in contexts of (real or predictable) violence aims to 
adequately respond to territorial secession, which is viewed by authorities as the 
violation of a sacred principle: State unity and indivisibility. In some cases, maintaining 
territorial integrity of a State includes the need to redefine the internal structures of 
regional and local administration, and establishing highly autonomous regional 
governments  (for example: Scotland in the United Kingdom; Catalonia in Spain). We 
cannot, however, forget that "different types of society require different types of 
institutions. Federalism, for example, may be irrelevant for small homogeneous 
countries but a necessity for bigger and heterogeneous ones" (Reilly, 1998: 137). 
Redefining administrative structures and sharing power imply dialog and compromise 
by the parties involved. We may find federalist theories within different ethnic 
nationalist movements, among which movements usually associated with extreme 
separatism8
Reference to the federal model as an effective means to promote and defend 
differences within a territory is not a novelty. Its apologia has yet increased when 
political structures in force have not adequately responded to claims that may 
jeopardize the existence of a State and its territorial integrity. Early introduction of 
mechanisms on sharing of power may prevent ethnic or identity conflicts from 
becoming deadly conflicts (Sisk, 1998: 139). Alain-G. Gagnon advocates that 
 Under such circumstances, we may conclude that secession occurs only 
when, despite everything, these alternatives are deemed insufficient to meet the claims 
of all parties involved (State, region, political actors, society) and resolve a conflict, 
regardless of its level of violence. The end of negotiations or their non-conclusion 
frequently leads to maintaining a state of violence whose consequence may be a 
unilateral secessionist process. Though the idea of territorial integrity is demystified in 
these cases, the table of negotiations remain the place where the rules are established 
whether the new State becomes one of the few independent States. 
 
                                                        
8  It is rather usual that different positions and claims exist within some nationalist groups. If independence 
is frequently presented as the only possible and desirable solution in situations perceived as being of 
political, economic and cultural injustice towards an ethnic group; those advocating implementation of 
federalist solutions are an alternative to independence. The cases of Galicia and Brittany are examples of 
this. Ramón Maiz (1984) divides Galician regionalism between 1886 and 1907 into three ideological 
trends: liberal, traditional catholic and federal. On Galician nationalism / regionalism, see also Duran 
(1984). Similarly, the role of federalist thought in Brittany should not be underestimated due to the 
strong historical role it played in the local nationalist movement (Nicolas, 2001; Barbin, 1937).  
Interestingly, Basque nationalism also included a federalist current through the Mouvement Démocrate 
Basque that emerged in France in the 1960s (Gurrutxaga, 2005: 78; Izquierdo, 2001: 149-150). 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 4, n.º 2 (November 2013-April 2014), pp. 104-117  
Considerations on the role of federalism in managing ethnic plurality  
in multinational states in conflict prevention 
Daniel Rodrigues 
 112 
 
federalism, both in its institutional manifestations and sociological 
features, is a promising solution for managing coexisting political 
communities and in affirming the collective activities in States that 
include one or more nations (2010: 1). 
 
At first sight, the federal model appears to be an almost perfect conflict prevention and 
management tool. At least as perfect as other political institutional and structural tools 
created our adapted for that objective. However, it is Utopian to believe in perfection 
when conflict prevention and management and, ultimately, the individual are the focus. 
Neither federalism nor other mechanisms are perfect. When analyzing the role played 
by federalism in India and Pakistan after the independence in terms of managing their 
ethnic plurality, Katherine Adeney concludes that 
 
though it does not necessarily promote security and ethnic peace, it 
cannot be accused of increasing conflict, especially when in combination 
with other mechanisms (2007: 181). 
 
The federal model's ability as a conflict prevention and management tool has, however, 
made it rather popular, particularly in multinational contexts in which keeping territorial 
unity has been threatened by secessionist or irredentist claims. The issue of 
Transnistria has been open since the implosion of the Soviet Union and the 
independence of Moldova; it is a challenge for which a solution is yet to be found. 
Several proposals have been put forth to federalize the country so as to resolve the 
conflict but they have been unsuccessful. (VVAA, 2009; Lowenhardt, 2004). According 
to Andrey Safonov,  
 
it seems that, in our case, resolution is only possible through 
federalizing the former Socialist Soviet Republic of Moldavia using 
confederate elements. Moldova should let behind its unitary approach 
and Transnistria should give up its claims for full independence as 
member-State of the United Nations. (2009: 188). 
 
Another example of a conceptual proposal promoting federalism as means of conflict 
management may be found in the analysis by Bruno Coppitiers on the conflict between 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions in Georgia, and the Moldovan authorities. 
Coppitiers proposed that Georgia became a federal republic and those regions would 
enjoy local autonomy (2003). The conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation 
in the summer of 2008 destroyed any chances of internal administrative redefinition, at 
least in the short run. The proclamation of independence by those two regions, 
politically, economically and militarily acknowledged and supported by Moscow only 
aggravated the situation and did not resolve the conflict for good. 
However, several examples of failed federations or, in the words of Emilian Kavalski 
and Magdalena Zolkos (2008: 163), "dead federalisms", evidence the limitations this 
model has in building a State, and simultaneously shows that federalism is no panacea 
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for contexts as those previously mentioned. Does this mean that this political model 
should be abandoned or at least refused as one of the most adequate solution for 
managing ethnic diversity in States where the situation is potentially explosive? Or 
does this mean that what is meant by federalism should be restructured depending on 
specific situations and accept that this may be inadequate though it was a valid 
response in other circumstances? As conflict management tool, in particular in ethnic 
conflicts, the federal model has the same objective as other institutional mechanisms, 
which is conflict resolution. 
 
The objective of conflict resolution is to establish an institutional 
framework in which the opposing interests of the main parties in conflict 
[...] may be accommodated in such a way that cooperation and non-
violent actions through compromise pose greater benefits that those 
which may be attained through violent confrontation. (Cordell & Wolff, 
2010: 17-18)9
 
. 
Federalism cannot be in any way viewed as a panacea for all world problems. (Watts, 
2003: 17). However, this is a solution which should not be ignored. According to Watts, 
hybrid systems are being developed which combine federal and unitary elements, as is 
the case in South Africa and in the European Union (idem, 18). Is that the solution? 
The variety of existing federalims and their ability to adapt to different cases may 
indicate that the federal regime should be accounted for as a model of State 
organization. If, according to J. Denis and Ian Derbyshire (2000, 19-22), federalism 
may be historical, cultural, geographic, linguistic, ethnic, artificial or imitative, this 
characterization is always cumulative. Thus, Belgium is defined as a cultural and 
linguistic federation by these authors, and Switzerland is a historical a cultural one. 
Bosnia-Herzgovina, on the other hand, is not only a historical and cultural but also an 
ethnic federation. However, this definition may easily questioned. Switzerland would be 
a clear example of an ethnic federation though, unlike other cases, the Swiss federation 
is not based on an ethnic on linguistic differentiation. The implementation of a federal 
regime is a paradox. If, as mentioned before, federalism is a response to the 
traditional, unitary and centralized State-nation, its implementation should also be 
different. Yet, some issues require clarification. According to Carré Malberg "the federal 
State seems rather a unitary State in certain things" (1962: 96). This is rather 
contradictory and the reason lies in the principle of overlapping. Subordination of 
federal entities to federal power leads to their competences being limited and to legal 
conflicts between the two levels. It is not uncommon for the federal State to be 
accused of wanting to take on a role that is beyond its competences and become the 
omnipresent State. The American case is a rather obvious example of this. Considering 
it is half way between confederalism and Unitarianism (centralism), federalism is often 
criticized by advocates of both regimes. Its implementation and maintenance result 
from the permanent tension between those in favor of a strong federal State and those 
for as great an autonomy as possible for federal entities. Historically, the need for 
greater political integration and a strong executive power was responsible for 
confederate regimes opting for stronger centralization and, thus, for federal regimes. 
                                                        
9  Italics in the original. 
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Going back to the Swiss federal model, we must remember that it derives from a 
seven-hundred old development which has undergone three distinct stages. When in 
1291 the cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden joined in the so-called Uri alliance, 
renewed in 1315 through the Boden alliance, they could not imagine this would be the 
beginning of the Swiss Confederation. According to Andreas Wimmer (2002: 233) the 
Swiss model is characterized by the so-called "linguistic peace" that makes it different 
from traditional minority protection regimes in that they refuse to make official the 
minority status of the languages spoken in the country. This means that, despite 
German being the most spoken language in the Swiss Confederation, French, Italian 
and Romance do not have a different legal status or is there any linguistic policy to 
protect and/or promote these languages. Ultimately, these are national Swiss 
languages as is German. "Politically speaking, Switzerland dos not acknowledge 
minorities" (idem, ibidem). 
However, and despite the exception of Switzerland, acknowledging policies (or identity 
policies) are very important. Their importance should be emphasized through analyzing 
how viable the federal model is in conflict management, prevention or resolution. 
Considering that federalism is an option for accommodating national minority groups, 
maintaining them within national limits, it should aim to positively respond to minority 
claims. Federation can achieve that through two different means, whether should equal 
sharing of power or through assigning more competences to minorities, namely in 
terms of their influence in decision-making. Yet, politicization of identity may also lead 
to new challenges, especially in federal regimes in which there is risk of instability 
linked to the existence of strong ethnic national feelings by minorities. Maintaining 
double political loyalty10, or two political loyalties11
 
, is needed, as is self-governing 
status, and these may lead to increased instability if subverted by growing local 
interests despite the common good the federation represents.  The federal model may 
involuntarily be adding to secession rather than fighting it. Acknowledging and 
institutionalizing different would be undermining a common identification. 
Conclusion 
Interestingly, federations are often viewed as deviant regimes. As the unitary and 
centralized post-Westphalian type is considered the ideal State system, federalism may 
seem sui generis. The fact that there are different types of federations is proof of that. 
Considering there is not one type of federalism, a typical federalism, it appears to 
suffer from legal schizophrenia for which there is no cure but rather new variations. 
Each federation is federal in its own way. Noteworthy is also the fact that regimes with 
federal features, and therefore differentiating themselves from the unitary State, are 
not a modern innovation. As analyzed here, they are in existence since Antiquity and in 
several geographic contexts. 
This paper aimed at analyzing the main advantages of this model. Yet, it must not be 
forgotten that federalism is not infallible and must be viewed as one of the many 
                                                        
10  Double political loyalty means that, though it is one it includes two different loyalties (for ex.: regional 
and national, national and supranational). These are felt in the same way by the individual and neither is 
more important than the other. 
11  In the case of two political loyalties, two different loyalties are also at stake. However, though they can be 
simultaneous, they are not necessarily felt in the same way by the individual. Therefore, one loyalty may 
be considered more important than the other. 
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solutions possible. We aimed not at presenting an intensive and extensive study of 
federalism but rather a brief overview of this model as a viable tool in managing ethnic 
plurality in multinational States as well as in conflict prevention in contexts where 
ethnic plurality exists. 
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